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type of situation wherein Illinois banks may find the amendment
to be of considerable aid.
41
QUASI-CONTRACTS
While nothing of significance has been said about the law
of sales and suretyship, the essential equity which underlies the
enforcement of contracts implied in law receives further illus-
tration by reason of the holding in Nelson v. Fricke.42 Plaintiff
therein, having paid the price for, as well as having expended
funds on the improvement of, a vacant lot, discovered that the
vendor would not perform his oral promise to convey the prem-
ises. Rather than take a chance at securing specific performance
on the contract, plaintiff elected to sue at law, as in general as-
sumpsit, for recovery of the sums paid and expended. Defend-
ant denied making any agreement to convey but particularly
relied on the defense of the statute of frauds as a bar to suit.'
The court, acknowledging that such defense might have been ap-
plicable had the suit been based on the oral contract, affirmed a
judgment for plaintiff because to do otherwise would have re-
sulted in allowing the vendor to retain both the land and the
money paid therefor, a most unconscionable result. While not
new in principle,4 8 the case strengthens the view that implied
promises are not difficult to project when inequitable results would
otherwise follow.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES
Intimately connected with the problem of whether a particu-
lar remedy is available to a given plaintiff is the correlative
problem of whether the selected court will be legally able to
award the desired relief which, in turn, leads to questions con-
41 There is some occasion to think that the amendment was brought about by
reason of the problem posed in the case of Rock Finance Co. v. Central Nat. Bank of
Sterling, 339 Ill. App. 319, 89 N. E. (2d) 828 (1950), not in the period of this
survey. The decision therein was not released until after the amendment became
effective but it parallels the thought expressed in the amended statute.
42335 Ill. App. 273, 81 N. E. (2d) 763 (1948).
43 Falls v. Visser, 250 Ill. App. 481 (1928).
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cerning the presence or absence of jurisdiction. Nothing has
been said in the past year concerning the power of Illinois courts
to exercise their jurisdiction as that term relates to their ability
to hear and determine particular categories of proceedings. Some
points have been made, however, concerning the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the parties to the litigation.
Personal jurisdiction over a defendant in an in personani
action is usually gained by personal service of process, although
statutory substitutes do exist.' Effective personal service is had
when the constituted official appears in the presence of the de-
fendant and either delivers the summons to him or leaves the
same with him, the elements of reading the summons or of in-
forming the defendant of its contents no longer being necessary.
A query arose in Hatmaker v. Hatmaker,2 upon motion to quash
the service of summons, as to whether service was sufficient if
the sheriff merely slipped the summons under a locked door which
barred his access to the room when he had adequate reason to
believe the defendant was within and had refused to open the
door in order to prevent service. The trial court held the serv-
ice insufficient but the Appellate Court for the First District
reversed, absent any guiding precedent in Illinois, not simply
because the defendant could be served in that fashion but more
nearly because (1) the defendant appeared to have acquiesced
in the manner of service by reason of his remark that it was
"all right" when told of the sheriff's contemplated action of
slipping the summons beneath the door, and (2) the defendant
had apparently taken up and read the summons so served, wit-
ness his appearance and motion to quash the service. The lat-
ter would seem to be the weaker reason for it might suggest that,
no matter how the knowledge is conveyed, it is the presence of
knowledge that a suit is pending that is sufficient to confer juris-
1 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 137. Authority for the use of con-
structive service by publication in civil actions affecting status or property has
been enlarged, by Laws 1949, p. 1191, S. B. 237, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 138, so as to permit the use thereof in actions "to obtain the specific per-
formance, reformation or rescission of a contract for the conveyance of land"
where the defendant is a non-resident or personal service is otherwise unobtainable.
2337 Ill. App. 175, 85 N. E. (2d) 345 (1949).
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diction, a fact absolutely contrary to law.3 There is no doubt,
however, that an acquiesence in the manner of service will be
sufficient to cure what would otherwise be a defect in the ac-
quisition of jurisdiction.
Prior to 1949, the Illinois Motor Vehicles Act permitted the
use of substituted service on the Secretary of State, as agent,
only in cases where the defendant was a non-resident at the
time of the accident.4 The affidavit of compliance to support
such service, according to the holding in Rompza v. Lucas,5 must
be so worded as to show that the defendant was a non-resident
at the time of the accident. A default judgment there rendered
on an affidavit reciting that the defendant "is a non-resident of
this state" was ordered vacated on the ground that the affidavit
spoke only as to conditions existing at the time of making, hence
failed to show full compliance with the law then in force. Affi-
davits made hereafter should, to avoid all possible question, be
worded to show the residence of the defendant both at the time
of the accident and at the time of service. The amended statute
still omits any requirement that a receipt by defendant showing
delivery to him of the registered mail notice should be an essen-
tial prerequisite to the acquisition of jurisdiction',6 but any harm
from that omission is perhaps obviated by liberal provisions for
the opening of the default judgment and granting leave to defend.
Evidence of the acquisition of that type of jurisdiction neces-
sary to support a judgment in personam should appear in the
record, particularly in default cases. That evidence usually takes
the form of a return on the summons showing the manner of
service, which return is then authenticated by the signature of
3 Laney v. Garbee, 105 Mo. 355, 16 S. W. 831, 24 Am. St. Rep. 391 (1891).
4 See Carlson v. District Court, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947), noted
in 26 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 159, for the view that statutory substituted
service on a resident who subsequently departed from the state is invalid. The
Illinois legislature, in 1949, amended the local provision to obviate this defect, as
well as others, so the statute now applies to all motorists, whether resident or non-
resident at the time of the accident: Laws 1949, p. 1134, H. B. 235; Ill. Rev. Stat.
1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 95 2, § 23.
5 337 Ill. App. 106, 85 N. E. (2d) 467 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvIw 249.
6 See, on that point, Powell v. Knight, 74 F. Supp. 191 (1947), noted in 26
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 275.
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the sheriff. Lack of such signature on the return was deemed
sufficient, in Escue v. Nichols,7 on application made by the de-
fendant under a special appearance, to require the court to va-
cate the default judgment it had entered, despite the fact that
the defendant did not, in positive fashion, charge that service
had not actually occurred. Had service in fact been made, so
that jurisdiction could attach, an amendment to the return would
have been highly proper as there is ample authority in Illinois
to support an order permitting an amendment designed to vindi-
cate that jurisdiction.
8
Service of process may, of course, be waived for jurisdiction
may be gained by the voluntary submission of the defendant as
evidenced by his appearance in the cause. Common law techni-
calities regulating the use of a special appearance, designed to
make it clear that there was no intention to submit to jurisdiction,
often resulted in producing a result opposite to that desired, par-
ticularly when the special appearance was made by an attorney
rather than by the litigant in his own proper person.9 A 1945
amendment to Section 20 of the Civil Practice Act ° declared
that a special appearance, whether made in person or by attorney
should not be deemed to be a general appearance. The trial
court, in Gleiser v. Gleiser," appears to have overlooked the
amended provision when it held that a petition to vacate a de-
cree for divorce, void for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it ordered
the payment of alimony and attorney's fees, filed by a non-resi-
dent defendant through local counsel amounted to a submission to
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, acting because a violation of
constitutional right had occurred, promptly reversed the holding.
The pleader should, of course, be conscious of the fact that
the action he contemplates bringing should be promptly brought
to avoid the possibility of it being barred by limitation. A minor
point in that regard is to be found in the case of Holmes v.
7 335 Ill. App. 244, 81 N. E. (2d) 652 (1948).
8 Spellmyer v. Gaff, 112 Ill. 29, 1 N. E. 170 (1884).
9 Pratt v. Harris, 295 Il. 504, 129 N. E. 277 (1920).
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 144.
11402 Il. 343, 83 N. E. (2d) 693 (1949).
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Brickey12 where interpretation was given to the statutory pro-
vision limiting suits by the loser to recover money or property
lost in gambling transactions to a period of six months.13  The
action there filed was begun one day over the six-month period
following the gambling game but one day under a six-month
period calculated from the time of payment. The Appellate
Court held that, as no cause of action had accrued until the
money was paid, the suit was timely enough to warrant denying
a motion to dismiss based on a claim that the suit was barred. 14
Of considerably greater importance is the problem of limi-
tation involved in the case of Wilson v. Tromly, 15 one so rare
that the court said it was unable to find a precedent anywhere
in the United States. It appeared therein that two persons were
involved in an automobile collision with such disastrous conse-
quences that both died on the day of the date thereof. The
representative of one of the decedents instituted a suit for the
alleged wrongful death three days before the expiration of the
one-year period fixed by the Injuries Act 6 and obtained service
of process on the representative of the other deceased just one
day before the expiration of such period. The defendant, with-
in the time fixed by law for the filing of an answer but beyond
the one-year period aforesaid, filed an answer denying negligence
on the part of his decedent and accompanied the answer with a
counterclaim for wrongful death on the part of plaintiff's intes-
tate. A motion to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that
it was filed too late was sustained by the trial court and that
action was affirmed on appeal. It was admitted by defendant
that a separate suit would have been barred beyond question,
just as would be the case had an attempt been made to intro-
duce the cause by a belated amendment to the answer, 17 but de-
12335 Il1. App. 390, 82 N. E. (2d) 200 (1948), noted in 27 CICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 181.
13 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 330.
14 Use of such a motion is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 172 (f).
15 336 Il. App. 403, 84 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949). It is understood that, on leave
to appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court, not in the period of this survey, affirmed the
judgment therein: 404 Ill. 307, 89 N. E. (2d) 22 (1949).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1 et seq.
17 See Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939).
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fendant did assert that, as the counterclaim had been filed in apt
time with reference to plaintiff's suit, the cause of action was
saved by reason of Section 19 of the Limitation Act.' The Ap-
pellate Court, impressed by the fact that the one-year period
fixed by the Injuries Act is not merely a period of limitation but
is primarily a condition precedent to the enforcement of lia-
bility,' 9 held the saving provision of the Limitation Act inappli-
cable to wrongful death cases whether begun as original suits
or offered by way of counterclaim.
Choice of an appropriate remedy is also important. While
no new issues have been raised concerning law actions, some
points have been made over suits of equitable character. Be-
cause the original and basic function of equity had been to pro-
vide a remedy where relief at law was not plain or adequate, the
situation disclosed in Serafin v. Reid,20 when superficially exam-
ined, seemed to call for equitable action. The plaintiff there al-
leged that, in consideration of her forbearance from instituting
bastardy proceedings, the defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff
a weekly sum for the support and maintenance of the illegiti-
mate child for a stipulated period but that defendant had re-
fused to live up to the contract. Special ground for equitable in-
tervention was laid on the basis that the filing of many expensive
separate suits at law would become necessary to collect the suc-
cessive installments as they matured, for defendant had repudi-
ated his promise in its entirety. The defendant answered admit-
ting paternity but claimed the agreement had been obtained by
duress. The trial court, finding all issues in favor of the plaintiff,
enjoined the defendant from breaching the terms of the contract.
The Appellate Court, however, reversed because the ultimate re-
lief sought by plaintiff was a monetary judgment. It said there
was no need for equitable intervention because issues concern-
ing the validity of the contract could be equally well settled at
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 20. That statute extends an ordinary
period of limitation by so much as an additional nine months after the date of the
appointment of a legal representative for a deceased injured person.
19 Bishop v. Chicago Railways Co., 303 Ill. 273, 135 N. E. 439 (1922).
20335 Ill. App. 512, 82 N. E. (2d) 381 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KEWT LAW
REviEw 179.
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law where the determination would become binding on the par-
ties by reason of the principle of res judicata. Without prior
recourse to legal proceedings, the court said plaintiff would be
lacking foundation for any claim that defendant was insolvent
or was vexatiously persisting in his breach of contract and, ab-
sent these, there was nothing to show any inadequacy in a suit
at law.
Although the Appellate Court failed to see any inadequacy
of legal relief in the child-support case just mentioned, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court had no trouble finding jurisdiction, in Wiley
v. Lamprecht,21 for a court of equity to act to restrain inter-
ference with the enjoyment of an alleged easement, even though
that easement had not been established at law. The court did
say that the right to the easement had to be clear and certain and
that the threatened interruption thereof had to be injurious, but
a person comparing the two cases is likely to be struck with the
thought that property rights would appear to have been favored
over human needs.
Where jurisdiction exists, equity has generally sought to
model its decrees according to the needs of the parties and with
an eye to that which would be appropriate considering the na-
ture of the case. In matters of encroachment upon the land of
a neighbor, it has always weighed the extent of the encroach-
ment, the cost of removal, the resulting benefit to the adjoining
owner, the wilfulness of the invasion, and other factors in an at-
tempt to balance the equities between the parties. Two cases
arising in the past year serve to exemplify these points. In
LaCost v. Mailoux,22 a concrete walk admittedly encroached a
few inches upon, but did not interfere with the use of, the ad-
joining premises. A decree ordering the installation of a brass
plate in the walk to mark the true boundary line was affirmed
when it appeared that removal of the walk would serve no useful
purpose and that action had been taken only to avoid the danger
of loss of title by prescription. On the other hand, in the case
21400 Ill. 587, 81 N. E. (2d) 459 (1948).
22401 IMi. 283, 81 N. E. (2d) 920 (1948).
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of Nitterauer v. Pulley,23 the Supreme Court reversed the de-
cree and ordered the issuance of a mandatory injunction requir-
ing the removal of a garage which encroached to the extent of
three feet upon the adjoining lot, despite a claim by defendants
that they honestly believed they had built on their own land,
when it appeared that defendants did not know where the prop-
erty line ran and took no steps to ascertain its location before
proceeding with the work.
Equity will not act to restrain the legislative acts of legally
constituted law-making bodies, at least prior to the time when
the legislative function has been exercised and attempts are
made to carry the product thereof into operation. For that
reason, the Appellate Court, in Sparling v. Reich,24 after review-
ing all pertinent decisions in Illinois, there denied the right of
the plaintiff, a taxpayer, to obtain equitable interference with
consideration and adoption of an ordinance by a village council.
Cases concerning reformation or rescission in land contract
matters are considered elsewhere, 25 but one equitable lien case
might be discussed at this point. In Watson v. Hobson,26 the Su-
preme Court had an opportunity to deal with the principles gov-
erning such liens in a case where, by oral contract, certain prop-
erty owners agreed that the debts owed by them for attorney's
fees and other services, matters which had no connection with
the real property, should be a lien thereon and on the rental in-
come until such debts were paid. The court noted that an equita-
ble lien is "neither a debt nor a right of property but a remedy
for a debt," being a right of special nature over property
amounting to a charge or encumbrance thereon, so that the very
23401 Ill. 494, 82 N. E. (2d) 643 (1948).
24336 Il1. App. 576, 84 N. E. (2d) 879 (1949).
25 Cases concerning reformation or rescission in land contract matters are con-
sidered under the heading of Real and Personal Property, post. It might be ap-
propriate to note here that statutory proceedings for the partition of land, long
regulated by an act first adopted in 1874, are now to be conducted pursuant to a
new statute enacted during the period of this survey. See Laws 1949, p. 1182 et
seq., S. B. 183; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44 et seq. The new law repre-
sents a substantial recodification of the former one, the principal change being in
the deletion of the special practice provisions which formerly controlled and the
replacement thereof by a clause assimilating the practice in partition proceedings
to that followed in other civil actions.
26401 Ill. 191, 81 N. E. (2d) 885 (1948).
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property itself might be proceeded against. Express executory
instruments in writing indicating an intention to make a par-
ticular piece of property stand as security for a debt may be
given effect, but the contract in the instant case being simply an
oral one no equitable lien was created. The court was helped,
in reaching that decision, by the fact that there was no relation
between the particular piece of property and the services alleged
to have been performed by plaintiff.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS
A pleader must, as he approaches the task of drafting the
pleadings, give consideration to matters concerning proper par-.
ties to the litigation, for none without right should be permitted
to sue and none but wrongdoers should be charged as defendants.
Two points have been made over issues relating to proper par-
ties. The codification into Section 23 of the Civil Practice Act "7
of the prior equity rule, one which permitted the bringing in as
defendant of one who should be a necessary party plaintiff but
who had refused to permit the use of his name, was intended to
extend the beneficial effects thereof to law actions. 2s An attempt
was made, in Board of Education v. City of Chicago,29 to extend
this view to a case where a board of education sought to condemn
land for school purposes and named its own board of trustees
as a defendant since it had not, on request, instituted suit as
plaintiff. The majority of the court, taking the position that
the sole and only proper party plaintiff was the board of trus-
tees, said that, if recourse were had to the section in question
to permit a stranger to begin the suit by naming the only proper
party plaintiff as a defendant, the result would be to "inaugurate
a form of litigation which would know no bounds." The section
was held to be restricted to cases of joint parties where one or
more refused to join in the action.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 147.
28 See Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno., 1933, p. 46.
29 402 Ill. 291, 83 N. E. (2d) 714 (1949). Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opin-
ion based on the premise that the plaintiff was the real party in interest and the
proper one to bring the action.
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Courts in Illinois appear to be falling into the habit of al-
lowing what is essentially the establishment of a system of third-
party practice despite the fact that there is no clear authority to
warrant such action. While Section 25 of the Civil Practice Act 30
purports to authorize the bringing in of new parties "where a
complete determination of the controversy cannot be had," it
was the thought underlying that section to codify what had been
the equitable rule on the subject rather than the common law
rule, one which required the dismissal of the suit when indis-
pensable or necessary parties had been omitted.31 By permitting
the addition of the required new parties through the issuance of
a supplemental summons, the statute saved the plaintiff from
the added expense of beginning a new proceeding. It can hardly
be said to be authority for the practice of allowing a defendant
to bring in someone who owes a cross-liability to him for the
Illinois provision was modeled on Section 193 of the New York
Civil Practice Act, one which is subtitled "Indispensable and
conditionally necessary parties. 32 Sanction for true third-party
practice in that state rests upon an entirely different section of the
New York Act, one adopted in 1946, long after the enactment of the
Illinois statute and not reproduced therein. 33 Any authority for
such procedure in cases instituted in the Municipal Court of the
City of Chicago3 4 rests upon a rule peculiar to that tribunal35
and care should be taken to see to it that no reliance is placed
thereon in matters falling within the cognizance of other courts
of record. If the adoption of a system of third-party practice is
a desirable end, it should be accomplished by statutory addition
or by rule of court and not through an unwitting tolerance in
long-continued error.
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
31 See Ill. Civ. Prac. Anno., 1933, pp. 51-2.
32 Clevenger, Practice Manual 1949 (Baker, Voorhis & Co., Inc., New York, 1949),
p. 3-14 et seq.
33 Ibid., p. 3-18 et seq.
34 See, for example, Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Mutual Trucking Co., 337
Ill. App. 140, 85 N. E. (2d) 349 (1949).
35 Rule 25, Rules of Municipal Court of Chicago, Municipal Court Manual, 1950,
p. 29. The rule is modelled on Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States.
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Little has been said regarding the formality required in set-
ting forth the elements of a case or defense. The necessity for
an allegation of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence
in a suit based on negligence is so commonplace in Illinois that
a pleader would have to be more than forgetful to overlook mak-
ing such a statement when drafting a complaint. The case of
Prater v. Buell,36 however, adds to the pleader's burden by re-
quiring an allegation of plaintiff's freedom from contributory
wilful and wanton misconduct in all complaints charging that
type of conduct to a defendant. The presence of contributory wil-
ful and wanton misconduct on plaintiff's part has heretofore been
held to establish a complete defense 37 on the theory, long adhered
to in Illinois, that no person shall be permitted to profit from a
wrong in which he has participated. The instant case now serves
to fix the requirement not only as one of proper pleading but
also as one controlling the burden of proof on the issue, for what
one must plead one must also be prepared to prove.
A typical allegation in a complaint based upon a contract
makes reference to the consideration furnished in order to show
that the agreement is an enforcible one. It was claimed, in the
case of In re Frayser's Estate,38 that the absence of such an
allegation made the initial pleading filed therein fatally defective,
particularly since the charge of lack of consideration set up in
the answer had not been challenged by the reply and, therefore,
stood admitted.3 9 The pleader had, pursuant to statute,40 attached
a copy of the contract relied upon to the pleading as an exhibit.
It contained the usual acknowledgment of the receipt of "$1.00 and
other valuable consideration." Following the statutory direction
that the exhibit should be considered "part of the pleading for
all purposes," the Supreme Court said the language of the con-
tract amounted to a sufficient averment of consideration so as to
raise a triable issue. The phrase in question, however, comes
36 336 Ill. App. 533, 84 N. E. (2d) 676 (1949).
37 Willgeroth v. Maddox, 281 Ill. App. 480 (1935).
38401 Ill. 364, 82 N. E. (2d) 633 (1948).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 164 (2).
40 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 160.
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perilously close to a statement of conclusion,41 so reliance on con-
tractual verbiage to help out insufficiencies in a pleading may not
always be wise.
A fundamental requirement of procedure demands that plead-
ing, proof and judgment must coincide in order that a party be
not permitted to charge one claim, prove another, and receive
judgment on still a third.42 An infraction of that requirement
would seem to flow from the majority holding in Central States
Cooperatives, Inc. v. Watson Brothers Transportation Company,
I*c.,43 where the court, impressed with the statutory command for
liberality of construction in pleading,44 seems to have accepted the
view that all distinctions underlying the former actions have been
swept away without observing the proviso that there has been no
change in the substantial averments of fact necessary to state a
cause of action.45 The suit was begun, as in debt, to recover the
statutory penalty for an alleged wrongful detention of realty
after the expiration of a prior lease. Defendant, admitting use
and occupation during the period in question, claimed the pos-
session was lawful under an oral agreement to pay a specified rent
which sum defendant tendered in open court. Plaintiff then ap-
plied for and received a partial judgment as upon admission 46
and had the court reserve jurisdiction as to the "balance of plain-
tiff's demand." The defendant appealed from the partial judg-
ment on the ground that the admission was as to a case not
charged by plaintiff, in fact one highly contradictory to the funda-
mental theory underlying the original complaint, hence it was im-
proper to enter any judgment on the record then before the court.
The objection was brushed aside with the remark that, the plain-
tiff's claim being for use and occupation, there could "be no
41 In Central Security Co. v. Brewing Co., 166 Wis. 249, 164 N. W. 994 (1917),
it was held that a pleading charging that a promise was made for a "valuable
consideration" was fatally defective for failure to plead facts.
42 Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N. E. 512 (1917). The court said that
the rule of secundum allegata et probata is "fundamental In the administration
of justice."
43 336 Ill. App. 314, 83 N. E. (2d) 752 (1949). Leave to appeal granted.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 157.
45 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 155.
46 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 181.
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escape from the liability of defendant to pay the admitted amount"
no matter what the eventual determination might be as to the
true basis of recovery. The dissenting opinion, to say the least,
pays more attention to preserving the symmetry of procedural
law and shows keener insight into the reasons for insisting why a
plaintiff, having elected the theory on which he wishes to proceed,
should be forced to abide by that theory and not be permitted to
deviate therefrom. What may seem, at first sight, to be the doing
of "substantial justice" could well develop into substantial in-
justice if a plaintiff, permitted to hale a defendant into court on
one claim, is then permitted the right, without notice, to shift to
another.
Some confusion as to the nature of a bill of particulars would
appear to be present in the report of the case of O'Brien v.
Brown 7 for the court there talked of it as a pleading which, not
being evidence, could not go with the jury to the jury room but the
contents of which, and the admissions predicated thereon, could
be brought to the attention of the jury. That a bill of particulars
is not a "pleading"I in the ordinary sense of that term is borne
out by the fact that, unlike an exhibit, essential allegations may
not be left to be supplied thereby but must be made to appear in
the complaint or counterclaim which it supplements.48  The Civil
Practice Act, however, does direct that, if a bill of particulars is
demanded and the pleader files a sworn bill, the opponent must
respond with an affidavit under oath specifically denying the items
thereof or he will be deemed to have admitted the same.
4 9 It
would be thought, by analogy to the situation presented when
allegations in pleadings stand admitted for failure to deny,50
that proof as to the non-disputed items would be unnecessary.
The court, however, following the view of a Michigan case based
on a comparable statute,51 reached the conclusion that a failure
47 403 Ill. 183, 85 N. E. (2d) 685 (1949).
48 Dudley v. Duval, 29 Wash. 528, 70 P. 68 (1902), holds that a complaint can-
not be enlarged or amended by a bill of particulars, although the latter may operate
to restrict the proof which may be offered under the complaint.
49IU. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 161(3).
5o Ibid., Ch. 110, § 164(2).
51 Cohen v. Peerless Soda Fountain Service Co., 257 Mich. 679, 241 N. W. 810
(1932). The case might be distinguishable on the basis that the bill there con-
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to deny the specifications of a bill of particulars was not an ad-
mission thereof sufficient to obviate the necessity for proof.
52
While a fair degree of liberality is shown in the provisions
of the Civil Practice Act permitting amendments to be made to
pleadings,53 the case of North Pier Terminal Company v. Hoskins
Coal & Dock Corporation54 would indicate that there are limits
to the privilege conferred thereby, particularly after judgment
has been rendered in the trial court. Plaintiff there, as alleged
successor to the next of kin of a deceased employee, sought to be
reimbursed for sums compulsorily paid55 growing out of the
alleged wrongful death of the employee at the hands of the de-
fendant. The complaint did not recite to whom such payment
had been made nor did it allege that the decedent was survived
by a widow, or children, or next of kin.56 A verdict and judgment
for plaintiff in the trial court was reversed by the Appellate Court
on the ground that the complaint was fatally defective in this par-
ticular and the trial court was ordered to enter judgment for
the defendant notwithstanding the verdict on the theory that de-
fendant's motion to strike the complaint and dismiss the suit
should have been sustained. Plaintiff sought further review
before the Supreme Court on the ground that, by the remand-
ing order, it had been foreclosed from its right to amend
the complaint to cure the defect and, by reason of the one-year
limitation provision on wrongful death cases, could not seek other
relief by commencing another suit. The Supreme Court, however,
cerned set forth varied demands for the "reasonable" value alleged to be due for
services rendered and the court held that proof as to value was necessary, the
amount not being admitted by the failure to file a denial. As to admissions of
allegations of damages, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 164(2).
52 The court did reverse, however, to permit the taking of proof, because of
error on the part of the trial court in refusing to allow the party to offer any
evidence on the point.
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170. But see Leffers v. Hayes, 327
Ill. App. 440, 64 N. E. (2d) 768 (1946), noted in 24 CnIcAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
262, as to the power of a reviewing court to permit amendment after an appeal
has been taken.
54402 Ill. 192, 83 N. E. (2d) 748 (1949), affirming 333 Ill. App. 440, 77 N. E.
(2d) 546 (1948).
55 The obligation was said to grow out of the Longshoremen's Compensation Act,
33 U. S. C. A. §901 et seq.
56 The action under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 1, was originally de-
signed to benefit such persons.
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affirmed the action taken on the basis that any amendment of the
pleadings should have occurred prior to final judgment in the
trial court, 57 after which the record would have to stand un-
changed unless the case should subsequently be remanded with
direction to reopen the judgment and to grant a new trial. The
wisdom underlying the practice of re-examining the pleadings
shortly before judgment, in order to catch defects therein, is thus
made apparent.
In that connection, the holding in Bollaert v. Kankakee Tile
Brick Company" provided warning to counsel that any amend-
ment which might become necessary in the procedural record so
as to furnish adequate basis for the support of a judgment had
to be made prior to the time when notice of appeal was filed in
the case. Upon the filing of such notice, the trial court lost juris-
diction to do any more than certify the record in the state in which
it then stood. A logical application of that holding occurred in
Palefrone v. Shelton59 wherein the trial court, learning that the
Appellate Court on oral argument had expressed doubt as to
the finality of the order appealed from, proceeded to enter an
amended judgment order designed to carry its original purpose
into operation. 0 A certified copy of the expanded judgment
order,* offered to implement the appellate record, was rejected
and the appeal ordered dismissed on the ground that all power
to grant the amendment ceased with the filing of the notice of
appeal.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE
The argument over the right of a court of equity to appoint
a special commissioner to hear a case and thereby perform serv-
ices customarily rendered by a master in chancery, brought to the
57 Section 46(3) of the Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 170(3), was inapplicable as it was admitted that the purpose of the amendment
was not one designed to make the pleadings conform to the proof.
58317 Il. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAoo-KENT LAW
REVIEw 244.
59 337 Ill. App. 99, 85 N. E. (2d) 52 (1949), abst. opin. Leave to appeal denied.
60 The initial judgment had been "in favor of the defendants against the plain-
tiffs on the verdict of the jury, the jury having found the defendants not guilty."
After amendment, the judgment included the important phrase that "plaintiffs
take nothing by their aforesaid action, but that the defendants go hence without
day" and permitted the recovery of costs.
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fore by the case of Simpson v. Harrison,6 still continues unabated,
if one may judge by the question presented in the case of Price v.
Seator.62  Hearing of a petition filed therein to determine the
right to attorney's fees for services in a partition suit was dele-
gated to a special commissioner appointed for the purpose. No
objection was made to the order of appointment and reference,
in fact the complaining party participated in the hearings held
by the special commissioner, but special objection was made to the
report on the ground that the judge had no jurisdiction to appoint
the commissioner unless there was no qualified master in chancery
empowered to act.63 The objection was held groundless on the
premise that, as the judge is not required to spread the reasons
for the appointment of a special commissioner upon the records
of the court, it was presumed that he had acted for a sufficient
reason in making the appointment. The higher court, apparently
with tongue in cheek, noted the "extreme improbability of the
happening of the contingencies necessary to make lawful the ap-
pointment" of a special commissioner in a populous county such
as Cook County, but failed to find any evidence in the record to
rebut the presumption of regularity in the judicial act.
The right to an impartial trial having been constitutionally
guaranteed,54 the Illinois statute on change of venue provides a
reasonably adequate method by which to effectuate that guarantee.
When two or more plaintiffs or defendants are involved, the stat-
ute directs that no change of venue shall be granted unless the ap-
plication is concurred in by at least three-fourths of the affected
parties.6 5 A question arose, in Cory Corporation v. Fitzgerald,66
as to whether it was proper, for purpose of this statute, to count
those who were named as defendants but who had not been served
with summons or who had not entered a voluntary appearance.
61328 I1. App. 425, 66 N. E. (2d) 494 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvEw 32-3.
62337 Il1. App. 248, 85 N. E. (2d) 848 (1949). Leave to appeal denied.
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 90, § 5.
64 Ii1. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 5.
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, § 9.
66335 I1. App. 579, 82 N. E. (2d) 485 (1948). Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Further appeal was dismissed, 403 I1. 409, 86 N. E. (2d) 363 (1949),
for lack of a final appealable order.
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The majority of the Appellate Court for the First District, follow-
ing a view expressed as to an earlier statute, 67 came to the conclu-
sion that liberality of construction required a holding that only
those should be counted over whom the court had obtained jurisdic-
tion. Punishment for contempt for violation of a temporary injunc-
tion was there reversed because the chancellor had erroneously re-
jected a petition for change of venue, predicated on the ground of
prejudice on the part of the judge, on the assumption that an insuffi-
cient percentage of the defendants had joined in the request. The
court also noted that the proceeding being one designed to
punish merely for civil, as contrasted with criminal, contempt of
court, it was proper to petition for a change of venue therein.
It appearing that a trial will become necessary, the litigant
will be concerned with assembling the evidence necessary to sup-
port his case or defense advanced by his pleadings. In that re-
gard, he may wish to consider utilizing the procedure established
by Rule 17 of the Supreme Court 68 to obtain sworn lists of docu-
ments, photographs, letters, and the like, which are or have been
in the possession of the opposite party and which may be material
to the merits of the case. That rule, however, contains an excep-
tion to the effect that the rule "shall not apply to memoranda,
reports or documents" complied by or for either party in prepara-
tion for trial, nor to "any communication between any party or
his agents and the attorney for such party." Interpretation and
amplification of that rule was provided by the Supreme Court
in the case of Yowell v. Huter6 9 A will there involved was con-
tested on the ground of forgery. On pre-trial conference, the
trial court limited the number of expert witnesses who might tes-
tify but neither party was required to disclose the names of such
experts. The expert witnesses, over objection, were permitted to
use photographs taken in preparation for the trial, albeit the same
had not been listed according to Rule 17. It was said that no
error had occurred as the photographs fell within the exception
above noted, even though the term "photograph" does not appear
67 See Stauber v. Stauber, 200 Il. App. 137 (1916).
68 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.17.
69 403 Ill. 202, 85 N. E. (2d) 674 (1949).
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therein. The court also held that it was not error to refuse to re-
quire a party to divulge the name of his experts in advance of
trial,70 for which reason it would be wrong to permit a litigant
to indirectly obtain the names of such experts by requiring the
production of the materials which they had prepared.
Little has been said by the courts about the rules of evidence
as they operate to regulate the admission or exclusion of proof,
but Aldridge v. Morris71 should receive the attention of trial attor-
neys engaged in personal injury litigation. The Appellate Court
there held it proper to receive proof of the giving of a covenant
not to sue to one of two joint tort-feasors, as well as testimony
as to the amount of the consideration paid for such covenant, and
that whether the covenantee had or had not been made a party
to the suit. The court there also stated that it would be proper
to "submit not only evidence of such payment, but instructions
informing the jury of their right to consider such payment in
arriving at their verdict. " 72 Uncertainty produced by prior con-
flicting decisions on the point should be resolved by this well-
considered decision, particularly if the same should be approved
by the Supreme Court.
The legislature has provided some assistance, however, by
enacting a provision that "microphotographs of business records
may be admitted" under the statute providing for proof of book
accounts, 73 both before courts and administrative agencies, so long
as the reproductions conform to the minimum standards fixed
by the National Bureau of Standards. The unhappy experience
of banks and other businesses who had made "recordaks" of
documents and other records only to find the same inadmissible
because they were not originals may have caused the legislature
to bring the statute into closer harmony with common business
practice. At the same time, the legislature forbade the use, in
civil suits, of accident reports required of owners of aircraft
70 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.23A.
71337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted in 27 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
REViEw 313. Leave to appeal denied.
72 See also Restatement, Torts, § 885.
73 Laws 1949, p. 919, S. B. 631; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 3.
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Elements of damage law were concerned in a few noteworthy
cases. Attention was directed last year to the Appellate Court
decision in Howlett v. McGarvey75 wherein the court held that a
non-dependent relative could not claim a right to recover, under
the Dram Shop Act, on the theory of a pecuniary injury to
''property" for a death caused by an intoxicated automobile
driver. The Supreme Court, on leave to appeal, affirmed the
holding therein on the basis that the phrase "pecuniary injury,"
as used in the Wrongful Death Act, referred to the measure of
damage and was not synonymous with similar language in the
Dram Shop Act.
76
The plaintiff did succeed, however, in two other cases. In
the first, that of Stephens v. Weigel,77 a husband and father was
granted recognition of his claim to loss of consortium and for
money advanced for hospital and medical expenses against the
driver of the automobile in which his wife and daughter were
riding on the theory that the wilful and wanton misconduct of the
driver removed the case from under the so-called "guest" stat-
ute,78 thereby saving the derivative action of the husband and
parent. In the other, that of Burnett v. Nolen,79 an automobile
dealer was allowed to recover a sum stipulated to be "liquidated"
damages from a purchaser who resold a car in violation of a
covenant not to make a resale within ninety days from the date
of purchase. While restrictions on resale are not favored and
liquidated damage provisions are apt to be designated as forfei-
ture clauses, the court felt that the provision was a reasonable
one in the light of the then current automobile shortage and was
consonant with a public policy directed against "gray market"
74 Laws 1949, p. 429, S. B. 530; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 151/,, § 2 2.42g.
75334 Ill. App. 512, 79 N. E. (2d) 864 (1948), noted in 27 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 42.
76 See Howlett v. Daglio, 402 11. 311, 83 N. E. (2d) 708 (1949).
77 336 I1. App. 36, 82 N. E. (2d) 697 (1948).
78 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 951/2, § 58a.
79 336 Ill. App. 376, 84 N. E. (2d) 155 (1949).
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operations. Difficulty in establishing actual damage was deemed
sufficient justification for a private agreement on the subject.
By far the most noteworthy case is that of Aldridge v.
Morris0 wherein the Appellate Court for the Second District
dealt with the question whether payments made by one tort
feasor for a covenant not to sue might be considered in mitigation
of damage assessable against another tort feasor involved in the
same wrong. It is impossible to reconcile, or to bring into har-
mony, the many prior Illinois cases bearing on the point, but
the opinion in the instant case is a powerful argument in favor
of the view that such payments are an element to be considered
in determining the amount of recovery and that whether the pay-
ment is made before or after judgment or whether the covenantee
is a party to the suit or not. It can only be hoped that the decision
will serve to clarify the rule in Illinois and not become just another
case in a long trail of confusion.
Two statutory changes have been made in this field. Re-
covery under the Wrongful Death Act may now be had by certain
enumerated persons, not previously eligible as they did not fall
into the category of widow or next of kin, provided no close
relative survives the decedent. Only those elements of damage
named in the amended statute can inure to the benefit of such per-
sons.81 A top limit of $15,000 has also been placed on claims arising
under the Dram Shop Act 2 but it is uncertain whether the sum
mentioned is intended to cover maximum liability for all persons
harmed in the one occurrence or is a ceiling with respect to re-
covery by each one. Any statement of the legislative intent con-
cerning the point would be mere surmise, so the problem must be
left to the courts to settle the question.
8 3
80337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviw 313. Leave to appeal denied.
81 Laws 1949, p. 1029, H. B. 566; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
82 Laws 1949, p. 816, H. B. 957; 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
83 A vexing problem concerning the applicable period of limitation to dram shop
actions has, at least, been settled. If treated as suits based on a statute, the
five-year period fixed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 16, might have con-
trolled. See O'Leary v. Frisbey, 17 Ill. App. 563 (1885). If, on the other hand,
such actions were essentially suits for wrongful death or personal injury, a
shorter period would be applied. The legislature has now made specific provi-
sion for a two-year limitation: Laws 1949, p. 816, H. B. 957; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949,
Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
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APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
A degree of appellate review of trial court judgments is pos-
sible, in the trial court itself, through use of a motion in the nature
of a writ of error coram nobis filed pursuant to Section 72 of the
Civil Practice Act. 4 The extent thereof would seem to be limited,
however, not only by controlling common law principles85 but
also by the nature of the proceeding in which the attempted use
is had, judging by the holding in Department of Public Works
and Buildings v. O'Brien.8 6 It was there decided that use of
a motion in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis was improper
in a condemnation proceeding since that motion is available for
use only in cases prosecuted according to the course of the com-
mon law. Although other statutory types of proceedings have
been modified so as to bring the procedure therein into conformity
with that applicable to ordinary law cases, s7 no such provision
appears in the Eminent Domain Act. 8 That statute being silent
concerning the way by which relief may be obtained where a trial
judge has entered an order because of error of fact, it can only
be supposed that, under the present state of the law, such error
must go uncured for want of an appropriate means to bring the
matter to the attention of the court.8 9
True appellate review is possible only if all conditions prece-
dent thereto have been met, otherwise the appeal will be dismissed.
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 196.
85 Compare Gustafson v. Lundquist, 334 Ill. App. 287, 79 N. E. (2d) 306 (1948),
with Bishopp v. Risser, 334 Il1. App. 522, 79 N. E. (2d) 835 (1948).
86402 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. (2d) 280 (1949).
87 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 11, as to forcible entry
and detainer suits, and ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 43, as to partition cases.
88 Ibid., Ch. 47, § 1 et seq.
89 The Eminent Domain Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 12, does au-
thorize an appeal "as in other civil cases," but such appeal could hardly serve
the purpose as the error would not appear on the face of the record. The dis-
senting opinion of Crampton, J., in Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402
Il1. 291, 83 N. E. (2d) 714 (1949), would seem to suggest that Rule 2 of the Illinois
Supreme Court, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.2, assimilates the Civil
Practice Act provisions to cases falling under the Eminent Domain Act, despite
section 1 of the former statute which excludes condemnation cases from its opera-
tion, on the ground that issues of procedure not specifically regulated by the spe-
cial act are matters cognizable under the general law. It is worthy of note, how-
ever, that this idea does not seem to have come to his mind when he wrote the
opinion in the instant case.
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Time, for example, is of unquestioned essence in connection with
appeals from judgments in forcible detainer actions for the statute
permits review only if the appeal is taken within five days.90 It
is not always clear, however, according to the holding in Atlas
Finishing Company v. Anderson,9 whether the five-day period is
to be measured from the date of the original judgment or from
the date of disposition of a motion directed against the judgment.
The defendant there had presented a written motion to vacate the
judgment for possession and to grant a new trial and, upon denial
thereof, promptly took an appeal. It happened that more than
five days had elapsed between the original judgment and the order
disposing of the motion, so a majority of the judges of the Appel-
late Court for the First District ordered the appeal dismissed,
regarding the motion as not being one to vacate the judgment but
rather, as defendant had labelled it, a motion for a new trial which
was insufficient to stay the running of the five-day period. A dis-
senting opinion therein, one which emphasizes the character of
rather than the title given to the defendant's motion, would seem
to be more in harmony with the spirit of the Civil Practice Act.
In much the same way, interlocutory orders may be reviewed
only provided they fall within the category of appealable orders.
The statute which authorizes appeal from certain of these inter-
locutory orders92 must, according to the holding in Kimbrough
v. Parker,93 be read in conjunction with Rule 31 of the Illinois
Supreme Court.9 4 The appellant there concerned had his appeal
dismissed because no motion had been made in the trial court to
vacate an ex parte order granting the issuance of a temporary
injunction, although use of such motion is expressly commanded
by the rule referred to. An attempt to avoid the application of
9O Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 19. It might be noted, at this point,
that the legislature amended Section 20 of that statute at its last session so as to
require that the appeal bond filed by the tenant shall be conditioned to guarantee
the payment of all rent, due or to become due, regardless of the outcome of the
appeal: Laws 1949, p. 961, S. B. 291; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 20.
91 336 Ill. App. 167, 83 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
RvIE W 251. Niemeyer, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
92111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
93336 Ill. App. 124, 83 N. E. (2d) 42 (1948).
94 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.31.
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the rule on the ground that, since notice of intention to apply
for a temporary injunction had been given, the matter had not
proceeded in true ex parte fashion was answered by pointing out
that the term applies alike to cases where (1) no notice is given,
or (2) where no response is made to a proper notice. 95
Relief by way of appeal is generally limited to cases where
the litigation in the trial court has progressed to the point where
a "final" order has been obtained. An appeal prior to that point,
except where expressly authorized by statute," is usually deemed
premature and will be dismissed on motion or even at the instance
of the reviewing court in the absence of a motion to dismiss.
There is no little confusion as to what constitutes a "final"
order,97 but even worse confusion has been generated, in cases
based on two or more counts, because of the presence of a statute
which permits more than one judgment in a cause,98 for trial court
action on one count may well precede action on the other. The
force of this observation may be seen in the case of Roddy v.
Armitage-Hamlin Corporation99 where a plaintiff, minority share-
holder in a corporation, filed a two-count complaint by which he
sought (1) to obtain the advantage of his position as a dissenting
shareholder under Section 72 of the Business Corporation Act,1
and (2) to secure the annulment of a lease made by his corpora-
tion on the ground the same had been obtained by fraud. The
first count was dismissed on motion but the trial court retained
jurisdiction as to the second. An appeal from the order dismiss-
ing the first count was also, on motion, dismissed by the Appellate
Court for lack of a final order. On leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court, that court reversed and remanded with direction to hear
the appeal on its merits on the ground the order dismissing count
one of the complaint was a final adjudication as to the claims
95 See City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis Hotel Corp., 280 Ill. App. 247
(1935).
96 Il. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
97 Compare Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50
N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RLWEW 207, with Gould v.
Klabunde, 326 Ill. App. 643, 63 N. E. (2d) 258 (1945).
98 Iln. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174.
99 401 Inl. 605, 83 N. E. (2d) 308 (1949).
1 11. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.72.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-1949
advanced thereunder. The argument that only one cause in fact
existed between plaintiff and defendant failed when the court
noted that the claims advanced were based first, upon wrong done
to plaintiff in his individual right, and second, to his corporation
in whose behalf he sued in a representative capacity. The case
confirms prior holdings as to the degree of finality present in an
order dismissing a separable part of one controversy 2 and in
dismissing a distinct but related claim in favor of the same
plaintiff against the same defendant.3
The power of a reviewing court, after review, is generally
confined to affirming, reversing, or reversing and remanding the
case for further proceedings. In that regard, the unitary char-
acter of a common-law judgment against several defendants was
such that if it became necessary to reverse the same, on appeal
taken by one of the judgment debtors, it was necessary to reverse
as to all. An enlightened view developed to the effect that the
common-law rule tended to impede the practical administration
of justice hence, whenever possible, a court was expected to re-
verse only as to the persons affected by the error, leaving the
judgment to stand as to the rest. That view became codified in
Section 92(e) of the Civil Practice Act 4 and was given application
in the earlier case of Minnis v. Friend,5 wherein the court treated
a judgment against a number of tort feasors as being sufficiently
divisible to permit a partial affirmance as to certain of the defend-
ants but to be open to reversal as to others. It was urged in
Zahn v. Muscarello,6 that the "silent" treatment given to the
holding in the Minnis case in the passing years was such as to
warrant the assumption that the doctrine thereof had been nulli-
fied so as to require a restoration of the original conception afore-
mentioned. The court, however, refused to agree that the Minnis
2 Hoier v. Kaplan, 313 Il1. 448, 145 N. E. 243 (1924).
3 Newberry Library v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 85, 55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 216(e).
5 360 Ill. 328, 196 N. E. 191 (1935).
6 336 Ill. App. 188, 83 N. E. (2d) 504 (1948).
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case had, in any way, lost its significance, pointing out that the
interim cases relied on 7 were all distinguishable or fell within
recognized exceptions to the more enlightened concept.8
Mention might also be made, at this point, of the fact that
the legislature has directed that all appeals in cases involving
the validity of county zoning ordinances or resolutions shall be
taken to the Supreme Court,9 thereby avoiding delay in obtaining
review as well as eliminating the interposition of an extra appeal.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
Only two cases of significance may be noted concerning the
enforcibility of final judgments or legal processes designed to aid
therein. It is familiar law that a writ of execution issued to en-
force a law judgment becomes functus officio at the expiration of
ninety days from its date' ° so that any act done in pursuance there-
of subsequent to its expiration may well expose the public officer to
liability for lack of valid authority to act. That doctrine was in-
voked by the plaintiff, in Horner v. Bell," as sufficient reason to
hold a sheriff liable for loss and damage done to personal property
which he had removed from certain mortgaged premises under
a writ of assistance issued to effectuate a foreclosure decree ren-
dered in equity, but which writ had not been served until some
six months after the date of its issue. The Appellate Court for
the Third District, reversing a judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
held the doctrine as to executions inapplicable for the reason that
writs of assistance are issued under another statute which makes
no provision for their expiration. 12  Such writs, the court said,
would not expire until the command expressed therein had been
fully obeyed.
7 People v. Gentile Co-op Ass'n, 392 Ili. 393, 64 N. E. (2d) 907 (1946); Gray
v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 388 Ii1. 124, 57 N. E. (2d) 363 (1944) ; and Fredrich
v. Wolf, 383 Ill. 638, 50 N. E. (2d) 755 (1943).
8 It should be noted that the Civil Practice Act provision is applicable only to
reviewing courts. No authority is given to a trial court to vacate a judgment in
part but retain it in force as to other defendants: Brown v. Zaubawky, 388 Ill.
351, 57 N. E. (2d) 856 (1944).
9 Laws 1949, p. 1197, H. B. 554; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 8.
11 336 Ill. App. 581, 84 N. E. (2d) 672 (1949).
12 111. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 42.
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The much litigated case of Roth v. Kaptowsky 13 has finally
resulted in a determination that Section 19 of the Garnishment
Act 14 is broad enough to permit a court to enter a judgment in
favor of a creditor against a garnishee under which monthly in-
stallments payable out of the proceeds of a life insurance
option settlement may be appropriated, as the same mature,
toward the payment of a judgment against the life in-
surance beneficiary. As a result of that decision, one
said to be completely novel in the law of this state, new suits
to reach the successive monthly payments as they become due are
rendered unnecessary. The case affords a striking parallel to the
doctrine of Levinson v. Home Bank & Trust Company 5 wherein
the garnishee was permitted, under Section 13 of the Garnishment
Act,' 6 to set off all demands against the debtor whether the same
were due at the time of garnishment or not. Logical extension of
the instant case could carry the creditor's right over so as to
reach the proceeds of other installment contracts.
One slight change has been made to the Attachment Act by
the addition thereto of a section setting forth a preferred form
of affidavit for attachment. 7 The section is permissive in char-
acter.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
There has been a scarcity of cases of any serious import in
the field of substantive criminal law since the last issue of this
survey, but a few new points have been made. In People v.
Wheeler,' for example, the indictment contained two counts,
one charging a fraudulent and felonious embezzlement and con-
version of certain personal property which had been loaned to
defendant, the other charging embezzlement of property which
13401 Ill. 424, 82 N. E. (2d) 661 (1948), affirming 333 Ill. App. 112, 76 N. E.
(2d) 786 (1948). See companion aspects of the case in 326 Ill. App. 415, 62 N. E.
(2d) 17 (1945), reversed in 393 Ill. 484, 66 N. E. (2d) 664 (1946).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 19.
15337 Ill. 241, 169 N. E. 193 (1929).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 13.
17 Laws 1949, p. 322, H. B. 216; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 11, § 2a.
'403 Ill. 78, 84 N. E. (2d) 832 (1949).
